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Insolvent enterprises
unbalance the budget
Inna LUNINA, International Centre for Policy Studies
State support of insolvent enterprises leads to an increase in direct budget
financing and invention of various implicit subsidies. Such policy threatens the
regular functions of Ukraines budget
itter disputes regarding 1999 budget revenues and possi-
bilities for its increase accompanied the recent budget
process in Ukraine. Today, budget revenues do not cover
current expenses on wages and transfer payments. For eleven
months of 1998, budget revenues in Ukraine fell down to
26.7% of GDP, compared to 30.4% of GDP in 1997.
One of the reasons for lower inflows to the budget is that en-
terprises continue to increase their debt in taxes and manda-
tory payments. The sum of debt owed to the budget and the
Pension Fund grew by over UAH 6.6 billion during 9 months
of 1998, which constituted 9.5% of GDP for the respective
period.
All attempts by the government to increase budget and pen-
sion revenues as well as reduce enterprises debts owed to the
budget (these include writing off and restructuring debts,
crediting, providing for clearances and implementing meas-
ures for reducing the debt) have been unsuccessful. The cur-
rent situation proves that budget problems in Ukraine would
not be solved unless state-owned enterprises and firms which
changed the form of ownership are restructured and their
subsidizing is discontinued.
Mutual debts between enterprises be-
come budget arrears
By October 1, 1998 the outstanding payments to the budget,
extra-budgetary funds and social insurance arrears reached
UAH 17 billion as reported by the State Statistics Committee.
Non-payments are widely practiced in the Ukrainian econ-
omy, but outstanding debts to the budget grow faster than
overall outstanding mutual arrears between enterprises.
Budget revenue decreases
rapidly in Ukraine. This
mainly results from in-
creasing debts to the
budget. Government
measures for dealing with
this problem have not
been successful
B
Outstanding debts to the
budget grow faster than
any other arrears. In
fact, mutual debts be-
tween enterprises, which
are the largest to energy
suppliers, are arrears to
the budget
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During the last two years the share of outstanding debt in the
total mutual debt between Ukrainian enterprises remained
roughly unchanged (about 75%), while the share of outstand-
ing debts from tax and mandatory payments grew from 68%
by January 1, 1997 to 82.5% by October 1, 1998. The share of
outstanding debt to the budget rapidly approaches 20%.
Consequently, mutual debts between enterprises are concen-
trated in debts to the budget.
The absence of structural reforms in enterprises
threatens the budget
1. Fictitious nature of the budget:
a) overvaluating expected budget revenues as a result of non-
payments. The reasons are:
· insolvent enterprises cover their losses by not making payments
to the budget
· profitable enterprises do not make payments to the budget and
in this manner cover their outstanding bills received
· as a result of overstated sales prices, which come from the de-
fault risk, enterprises receive virtual revenues, which would
never be considered a tax base
· enterprises able to pay taxes prefer working in the informal
economic sector because they cannot compete with enterprises
that receive direct and indirect subsidies (benefits, restructur-
ing and writing off tax debts)
b) overstatement of budget expenditures results from outsized
revenues and leads to:
· further increase in accounts payable by budget-supported agen-
cies
· preservation of costly and burdensome network of budget-
supported agencies
· excessive expenditures on the administration apparatus
· no stimuli to allocate budget funds effectively.
2. Worsening quality of expenditures with respect to clearances:
· increasing costs as a result of non-market pricing mechanisms
· additional expenses on distribution and sale of products
· impossibility of public control over expenditures
3. the need to continue direct financing of state-owned enter-
prises.
4. Additional expenditures on the formation of state reserves for
crediting loss-making enterprises. Failure to redeem these com-
mercial credits.
5. Potential loss of budget revenues because of the high tax bur-
den laid on concerned  tax payers
Paralyzed Enterprises
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Dynamics of outstanding accounts payable kept
by Ukrainian enterprises
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However, the structure of debts to the budget is not ho-
mogenous. Considering the behavior of defaulting enter-
prises, debts may be subdivided into the following groups:
· Non-payments in the branches where enterprises con-
tinuously report losses and compensate funds that they
lack through non-payments. Sooner or later, the govern-
ment writes these debts off. Nowadays, as well as during
previous years, such enterprises have been functioning
irrespective of their effectiveness. Enterprises use non-
payments for a de facto redeeming of funds that they
previously received as direct budget subsidies. This
group includes enterprises that belong to top-priority
branches (for example, the coal-mining industry and ag-
ricultural sector).
· Non-payments of loss-making enterprises that can re-
cover. However, according to the current tax system of
Ukraine, part of tax payments are anchored to certain
expenditures, and therefore such debts to the budget
may be justified by an inconsistent tax system. These en-
terprises would be able to cover their expenses if they
could orient upon demand and the market.
· Debts of potentially profitable enterprises-producers of
universal goods which are energy and gas. These are
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the most liquid goods that can be sold even under the
developed barter system1. The share of Derzhnaftogaz-
prom and Minenergo enterprises in the total debt owed
to the budget amounted to 23.8% and about 10% respec-
tively in the first half of 1998. Such a situation results
from accumulating non-payments created by weak enter-
prises in the hands of gas and energy producers and sup-
pliers. Arrears of these universal goods are huge, and the
latter are made to escape from paying to the budget, off-
setting bad accounts receivable.
The main reason for the accumulation of debt by enterprises
of all groups is government support of state enterprises and
firms that changed their form of ownership. This allows them
not to market changes and is the base for increases in non-
payments and barter.
Market implies strict budget con-
straints
Since transformation processes were initiated, numerous en-
terprises that changed their form of ownership had to trans-
form their structure and reconsider investment policies
which could allow for adjusting quickly to new demand and
sales conditions. Normally, this leads to economic growth in
the long run. The main idea of restructuring is to create
competitive industries and change the behavior of enter-
prises, introducing strict budget constraints2. The main char-
acteristics of the market economy are the following:
· Production and distribution of goods is regulated by the
price mechanism. Goods are distributed between those
                                                                
1 Barter goods may be divided into three groups by liquidity: (1)
universal goods (gas, energy, rail traffic), (2) relatively universal
goods that are inconvenient for transportation and storing (liquid
fuel, metal-crafted products, food products, and consumer goods),
insufficiently universal goods (all other goods and products). See
Volkonskiy V., Gurevych Y., Kuzovkin A., Saburov Y. Analyzing
influence of payments forms on price levels, Mathematical
methods in economics, 1998, volume 34, p.28.
2 Strict budget constraints have five distinctive features: (1) prices
are formulated by the market and enterprises cannot interfere in
this process, (2) enterprises cannot influence the level of taxation,
(3-5) there exists no governmental support; opportunity to receive
credits or external financing. See Kornai Y. Deficit. Moscow 1990.
Under new operation
conditions, state-owned
enterprises had to adjust
to strict budget con-
straints that are a core
part of the market econ-
omy. However, soft
budget constraints had
not been changed into
strict ones, as the gov-
ernment protected enter-
prises from the market.
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who are ready to pay the existing price. Other economic
agents do not consume these goods.
· Entrepreneurs produce only those goods whose price (at
least in the long run) exceeds production costs. As a re-
sult, an enterprise survives only if it reviews the propor-
tion of its revenues and costs.
· Quantity of goods that is available for an economic agent
depends on his purchasing power, i.e. budget con-
straints.
To conclude, market prices and the ratio between costs and
revenues define the behavior of an enterprise in the market
economy. In other words, these budget constraints make a
clear distinction between the market and administrative
economies.
In the command administrative economy, enterprises worked
under soft budget constraints. Revenues and costs were a
mere recording in the balance sheet and did not regulate an
enterprises operations. Enterprises that reported losses but
executed production plans became an every day occurrence3.
While losses did not regulate the behavior of enterprises, as
they did not expect any negative consequences, profits did
not give any explicit advantages. Decisions regarding an en-
terprises future were made at the central level, leaving aside
price mechanisms and profits factors. If the firm was consid-
ered important for the national economy, its operation costs
and investments were financed through bank credits, intro-
industry redistribution of revenues or from the budget. Na-
tional income, mostly concentrated in the central budget,
created wide opportunities for supporting priority branches
of the economy.
Actually, most enterprises have not been restructured so far
(in the sense of open and strict budget constraints). Though
the state policy is to support and implement market reforms,
some enterprises still can influence price levels and terms of
taxation, as well as rely upon state subsidies.
                                                                
3 As far back as 1998, the share of enterprises that reported losses
constituted 2.9% in the industrial sector, while in the transport
sector the share of insolvent enterprises was 14.5%. The real
number of loss-making firms is very difficult to calculate, due to a
wide-spread practice of intro-industry redistribution of revenues and
considering state price regulation.
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Potential bankruptcies won soft
budget constraints
A significant decrease in the demand for goods produced by
Ukrainian enterprises occurred in 1991-1992. Changes in the
demand for most products were observed both in internal
and traditional external markets. As soon as imported substi-
tutes became available in the domestic market and prices
were liberalized, non-competitive Ukrainian goods lost their
markets in FSU countries and at home. The most violent de-
mand shock affected military and technical products.
In a market economy, enterprises (due to strict budget con-
straints) should regulate their operations according to
changes in demand: renew the range of products, improve
their quality, decrease sales prices, and review the structure
and level of costs. Unfortunately, the majority of Ukrainian
enterprises did not follow these rules and never considered
changes in demand and terms of trade. In the industrial sec-
tor, the share of finished products in the structure of working
capital rose to 21% in 1992, while in 1993 it was already 31%,
as compared to 13% in 1989. However, neither in 1992-1993,
nor during the next five years did loss making state and col-
lective enterprises stop their operations4.
Finished goods in the structure of working capital
of the industrial sector of Ukraine, %
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Source: State Stàtistics Committee
                                                                
4 One can observe no bankruptcy procedure or a claim on the
property of agreement defaulter regarding a state-owned/
Insolvent enterprises con-
tinue to work, being in-
different to changes in
demand. Constantly
increasing production
costs and inventories of
finished goods result in
losses of numerous enter-
prises. However, the gov-
ernment introduced ex-
plicit and implicit subsi-
dies for enterprises, in-
stead of claiming prop-
erty as compensation for
the agreement default.
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Even today, enterprises remain indifferent to market signals.
Production costs tend to grow and inventories continue to
increase:
· Among the 100 enterprises that were major debtors to
the budget in the first half of 1998, every forth firm ac-
cumulated inventories of finished goods amounting to
20% of total production for the respective period. In 17
enterprises this indicator was 45%.
· 40% of enterprises kept inventories that exceeded a half-
year volume of production by over 50%
· In 1997, expenditures per UAH 1 of output (                 )
grew up to UAH 0.96 in the economy as a whole, reach-
ing UAH 0.98 in the industrial sector and UAH 1.22 in
the agricultural sector. In 1995, these indicators were
UAH 0.86, 0.89 and 0.98 respectively.
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As a consequence, the number of loss-making enterprises
began to grow rapidly. The share of such enterprises in the
economy increased from 9.5% to 53.4% for the period from
1992 to 1997 rising in the industry from 3.7% to 45.1%, and
up to 80% in the agricultural sector.
As soon as these hazardous tendencies began to spread over
in 1992- 93, the government had to force enterprises to trans-
form. Price liberalization was not supported by the creation
of market institutions, in particular, a liquid stock market,
Paralyzed Enterprises
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and those that provide for the implementation of contracts.
The most important pre-conditions for successfully introduc-
ing strict budget constraints are claims on enterprise prop-
erty and the threat of bankruptcy in case of agreement de-
fault.
Share of loss-making enterprises in Ukraine
%
Total Industrial
sector
Construc-
tion
Agricultural
sector
1992 9,5 3,7 3,3 0,7
1993 8,3 4,0 3,6 1,0
1994 11,4 6,5 4,5 5,7
1995 22,2 11,5 9,8 28,3
1996 43,0 30,0 31,7 66,0
1997 53,4 45,1 44,6 80,1
Source: State Statistics Committee
On the contrary, the government began to distribute direct
and indirect subsidies between enterprises in the form of di-
rect budget financing, tax privileges, budget loans and com-
mercial banks credits. Decisions regarding subsidizing cer-
tain industries and enterprises are made by the government.
It also guarantees particular enterprises that they receive for-
eign credit. Our calculations show that the volume of subsi-
dies given to Ukrainian enterprises reached about 20% of
GDP in 19975.
One of the arguments for supporting enterprises was the
threat of mass unemployment. However, such a policy did
not solve the problem, and only led to higher rates of hidden
unemployment. In the meantime, enterprises did not at-
tempt to solve new problems, while the government, which
was not sufficiently financing loss-making enterprises,
prompted an increase in wage arrears.
Subsidies, various cash substitutes and possibility no pay back
of debts became instruments that protect ineffective enter-
prises from strict budget constraints that characterize market
                                                                
5 Lunina I., Vincentz F. Subsidies to Ukrainian enterprises, Ukraine
at the crossroads, Kyiv 1998, p.118-132.
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relations6. As a result of such government policy, more and
more enterprises and sectors are involved in non-payments
(including debts to the budget) system, the use of available
resources becomes less effective, monopolization of produc-
tion grows and social discrepancies worsen. If preserved, such
support of unprofitable economic entities will endure an
economic recession in Ukraine and provoke a wide-scale
budget crisis.
Barter provides directors with mo-
nopoly rent
The absence of structural reforms, maladaptation of enter-
prises to changes in the market demand and, as a result, high
expenditures and huge arrears lead to the expansion of bar-
ter operations in the real sector and introduction of money
substitutes. Enterprises prefer barter to money transactions
even when they have cash7.
Besides the possibility of legal tax evasion, barter operations
have other negative consequences, such as the distortion of
pricing and non-transparent expenditures. Additionally,
authorities start to exercise unmeasured corrupt practices. In
particular, barter allows directors to act as monopolists re-
garding the assets of enterprises as well as improve their per-
sonal living standards.
The absence of effective ownership in an enterprise makes it
impossible to verify the activities of the director. In addition,
market mechanisms cannot impede the consumption of eq-
                                                                
6 In most developed economies, the government is often severely
criticized for subsidies. Distorting prices, they impede the
unrestricted flow of production factors in more effective economic
activities and increase the demand for cheap commodities. This
lowers the effectiveness of the utilization of restricted resources.
Subsidies, being a very specific social and political instrument,
should be used as a short-term facility, and the utilization of that
must be predetermined in advance together with objectives and
terms of subsidizing. Such financing must become equally available
for enterprises of different forms of ownership, and the allotment of
funds must follow market criteria.
7 In 1997, Khartsyzk pipe plant used rolled strip, which was supplied
by Mariupol Illich and Azovstal plants, for producing pipes. These
pipes were provided to Russian Gazprom as payment for gas
consumed by the three Ukrainian enterprises.
Barter allows directors to
act as monopolists and
command assets for their
own needs. The restricted
resources of an enterprise
involved in barter trans-
actions and the fact that
a large share of capital is
guzzled away, necessitate
budget financing. Today,
such injections are pro-
vided as clearances.
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uity, as capital decumulation does not influence stock prices
formulated in the illiquid equity market.
In fact, executives of stateowned and former state enter-
prises exploit monopoly rent from insiders information and
preferential terms of barter operations. A part of this rent is
distributed between those who are involved in barter transac-
tions (directors of partner enterprises and dealers), while the
rest of the rent is shared between government officials. Mo-
nopolization reached its highest in small inhabited localities,
company towns where vacancies are restricted. Monopoly
rent is the main factor that preserves and expands barter op-
erations in a post-socialist economy.
Working under the barter scheme, where profit maximiza-
tion and cost minimization are not priority points, it becomes
more important just to stay in business (compare this to the
socialist economic system with priority branches). A good
example of this thesis is the intention of the Donetsk regional
administration to create the consolidated Donbass market
two years ago. They proposed to integrate technologically
related enterprises of the fuel-energy and coal-metallurgic
sectors that would be regulated by state and market mecha-
nisms8. In practice, this means further employment of the
barter mechanism and control of relevant transactions on the
side of the regional administration. Following this scheme,
one is able not to consider the demand factor trying to keep
his enterprise in business.
Therefore, leaving state and collective enterprises unre-
formed would only result in further improvement and devel-
opment of the barter economy.
Enterprises which are involved in barter operations, own re-
stricted resources and disinvest their capital seek badly for
external injections, first of all from the budget. Thus, the
idea of financing budget expenditures with the help of en-
ergy bills was not coincidental. These securities would allow
for the de facto allocation of budget subsidies favoring un-
profitable enterprises as well as the redistribution of real
budget revenues to the advantage of the issues of energy bills.
Two proposals have been presented that would launch the
perpetual motion of budget financing of enterprises:
· The committee on budget issues of the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine proposed to employ energy bills for
                                                                
8 See Donetsk model potential, Uriadovy kurier, October 30, 1997.
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redeeming debts of enterprises owed to the budget.
Energy bills would also finance local budget expendi-
tures, which calls for legitimizing everlasting clearances
· Ukrgaz Company proposed to create the Energosoyuz
stock company, authorized to process bills for budget-
supported agencies, utility companies and individuals
on their debts of gas, heat and electricity. It would also
control these bills and formulate state orders for mate-
rial resources which would be oriented toward the de-
velopment of base sectors.
However, budget injections into barter schemes occur even
today in the form of taxes paid in goods and services as well as
clearances that spread over the two last years, after a series of
tax privileges were abolished. Thus, in 1997 clearances ac-
counted for 30.4% of budget revenue, or 9.2% of GDP; for 11
months of 1998 they amounted to 16% of budget revenue, or
4.3% of GDP9. Keeping in mind the possibility of employing
the clearance mechanism, it became expedient to accumulate
tax and mandatory payment arrears. Moreover, the govern-
ment supports this accumulation through relevant regula-
tions10.
The needs that enterprises are financed by clearance funds,
which are formally government revenues, are defined by en-
terprises themselves based on their output and possible bar-
ter schemes. Moreover, the producer, instead of the market,
also defines prices in clearance operations. This scheme of
payments to the budget results in the ineffective utilization of
available funds and an increase in budget expenditures.
Therefore, while nominal budget revenue grows the actual
budget deficit increases as well.
The budget is involved in barter operations most intensively
during its yearly provision of agricultural producers with ma-
terial and financial resources necessary to fulfil spring field
works and gather the yield. The barter scheme of budget fi-
nancing includes gas, oil, electrical energy, rail traffic, trac-
tors, seeding machines, combines, other facilities and ma-
chine parts; services on fixing agricultural machines, supplies
                                                                
9 In 1997 one third of all clearances occurred in December.
10 According to Temporary Methodical Directives on the Order of
Clearances approved by the Finance Ministry and the National Bank
of Ukraine, clearance cannot exceed the sum of debt.
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of fertilizers, seeds, sugar, meat and other agricultural prod-
ucts put in the State Reserve.
The illusion of increasing state revenue created by clearance
operations distracts the governments attention from the
regulation of budget-supported agencies, which would con-
sider real available financing. The decision to redeem wage
arrears in the budget sphere through emission cannot solve
the core problem of low effectiveness of budget expenditures
and eliminate an extensive network of budget-supported
agencies. Under these conditions, the financial stability in
the country remains transient.
Non-payments and fictitious revenues
Similar to barter, mutual non-payments practiced by unprof-
itable enterprises negatively impact Ukrainian budget reve-
nue: executives overvalue potential earnings. Non-payments
force economic agents to formulate prices not only with re-
gards to demand, supply and inflation expectations, but also
with consideration to default risk. Thus, suppliers fix higher
prices for potential defaulters11, which in fact leads to an
overstatement of their revenue. While a certain share of this
revenue will never be received, taxes are calculated on the
whole sum. This directly causes non-payments to the budget.
We argue that the fact described above justifies a constant
overestimation of budget revenue of Ukraine.
To conclude, the direct cause of non-payments to the budget
has been rather the non-market behavior of Ukrainian enter-
prises than a lack of working capital. All measures for reduc-
ing arrears and increasing proceeds from taxes do not elimi-
nate the roots of defaults, including non-payments to the
budget. As a result, two interrelated factors continue to con-
spire  state policy for subsidizing enterprises that impedes
the formulation of strict budget constraints and the absence
of structural changes in these enterprises.
Huge debts to the budget impose a painful tax burden upon
concerned taxpayers (both in absolute numbers and as com-
pared to defaulters) and reduce their investment potential.
The state, on its side, loses budget revenue and provides for a
further economic recession.
                                                                
11 While there exist fixed tariffs for products of monopolist
enterprises (for example, electrical energy), supplies that envision
prepayments can be officially paid by tariffs with a 25% discount.
Mutual non-payments
between enterprises result
in an over-estimation of
budget revenue. In its
turn, non-payments to
the budget directly relate
to this fictitious revenue.
This results in a pain-
fully heavy real tax bur-
den imposed on con-
cerned taxpayers.
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Back to the socialist system?
Based on the above, we can conclude that the reluctance to
restructure former state-owned enterprises, absence of claims
on property owned by defaulting enterprises, and inconsis-
tent budget policy leads to the following:
· Budget and enterprises wage and transfer payment
debts continue to increase
· Growing tax and mandatory payment arrears are favored
by enterprises, as there exist possibilities to restructure
or write off accumulated debts
· Directors are interested in barter and mutual non-
payments
· Extensive scheme of barter transactions in the budget
sphere is the issue of direct concern of enterprises
· The government fails to regulate the efficiency of the
allocation of budget funds
Thus, the absence of real structural reforms in Ukrainian en-
terprises creates additional direct budget financing and re-
sults in implicit subsidies from the budget. This threatens
normal budget operations and draws the economy back to
the socialist system that redistributes revenues of efficient
enterprises for the support of loss-making ones. Moreover,
the absence of government control over operations in the
real sector and lack of market institutions in the economy
would be favored by sparticular individuals.
The absence of real struc-
tural reforms in Ukrain-
ian enterprises creates
additional direct budget
financing and results in
implicit subsidies from
the budget. This threat-
ens normal operations of
the budget and draws the
economy back to the so-
cialist system that redis-
tributes revenues of effi-
cient enterprises for the
support of loss-making
ones.
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The government creates bad debts
in Ukraine
Serhiy ILCHUK, International Centre for Policy Studies
If one compares the scale of non-payments between enterprises to the size of wage
and tax arrears in Ukraine, he may call it insignificant. Huge inter-payment
debts accumulated by enterprises result mainly from a high natural level of
goods (commercial or tied) credit in Ukraine. By now, enterprises have begun to
differentiate between customers and do not collect accounts receivable that will
be never be redeemed. The main factor creating heavy arrears to the budget and
employees and, moreover, making them grow is government policy. Arrears
accumulated in the Ukrainian economy may decrease only if strict budget
constraints are implemented (through bankruptcy and shutting down loss-
making enterprises), the tax burden is reduced and economic regime is
liberalized. This may help achieve stable economic development.
Inventory of debts
Usually, liabilities are divided into accounts payable and re-
ceivable. Payables are an enterprises liabilities to its suppliers,
while receivables  are customers liabilities to the enterprise.
The State Statistics Committee of Ukraine divides accounts
payable and receivable into internal (to the residents of
Ukraine) and external (to non-residents). In this article we
will concentrate on internal arrears12, as external debts result
mainly from other factors and their dynamics are different.
Accounts payable are subdivided into tree categories:
· Arrears of commodities, operations and services
· Tax and mandatory payment arrears
· Wage arrears
while accounts receivable are of two types:
· Arrears of commodities, operations and services
· Budget debts and tax arrears
                                                                
12 Data include arrears of payments with Ukrainian partners of all
forms of ownership, excluding small enterprises and budget-
supported agencies.
Main types of accounts
payable in Ukraine are
mutual debts between
enterprises, debts to the
budget, and wage ar-
rears; accounts receivable
are divided into debts
between enterprises and
budget debts. The number
of accounts payable ex-
ceeds the number of ac-
counts receivable.
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Accounts payable of Ukrainian enterprises
amounted to UAH 121 billion as of October 1, 1998
Goods
and services
(UAH 71,3billion
59%
Wage arrears
(UAH 6 ,4billion )
5%
Other
arrears
(UAH 21 billion)
17%
Tax and other
mandatory
payments
arrears
(UAH 22,5 billion)
19%
Source: State Statistics Committee
Accounts receivable of Ukrainian enterprises
amounted to UAH 92 billion as of October 1, 1998
Goods
and services
 (UAH 68,4 billion )
74%
Other
debts
(UAH 19,5billion
21%
Budget arrears
and tax payments
(UAH 4,2 billion)
5%
Source: State Statistics Committee
As tax payments owed to the budget by Ukrainian enterprises
are much larger than budget arrears to enterprises, the ag-
gregate number of accounts payable (together with wage ar-
rears) accumulated by Ukrainian enterprises exceeds the
number of accounts receivable.
However, all the mentioned types of arrears appear not only
in transition economies. Thus, inter-payment debts of enter-
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prises amount to 10-18% of GDP in developed economies13.
In fact, mutual debts of enterprises are goods (or commer-
cial) credits that serve as a substitute for bank credits. Often
enterprises temporally increase their arrears in order to
smooth economic shocks that they undergo. At the same
time, the practice of wage arrears is unknown in developed
economies and tax arrears are insignificant. For example, in
New Zealand the volume of tax arrears amounted to 0.3% of
GDP14 in 1994.
Enterprises inter-payment arrears: a
substitute for credit
The main precondition of inter-payment arrears between
Ukrainian enterprises is the external shock resulting from
economic collapse in FSU countries and in COMECON15, as
well as internal shock connected to the transition from the
administrative to the market economy.
Ukrainian enterprises were severely hurt when, after the
price liberalization, energy became expensive and demand
re-oriented from industrial products (extensively produced
in the FSU) to consumer goods. In addition, after external
trade was liberalized, imported commodities became more
competitive and crowded out downscale domestic goods.
At the beginning of transformation, actual overproduction
and the inability to go by market mechanisms resulted in
omnivorous shipments of goods to various customers, includ-
ing those who were not able to pay for them. According to
Shyrmer and Pivovarsky16, such tactics turned out to be a typi-
cal reason for increases in debts kept by every transition
economy, in particular, by Eastern European countries.
                                                                
13 Alfandari, Gilles and Mark E. Schaffer. Arrears in the Russian
Enterprise Sector, CERT Paper, March 1996.
14 Gao, Shumei and Mark E. Schaffer. Financial Discipline in the
Enterprise Sector in Transition Countries: How Does China
Compare?, CERT Paper, February 1998.
15COMECON  Committee for Economic Assistance, members of
which were former socialist countries.
16 Shyrmer, J. and  . Pivovarsky. Arrears and the Economy: the Case
of Ukraine, HIID, Draft Paper, 1996.
Mutual arrears between
enterprises emerged at the
beginning of transforma-
tion because of internal
and external shocks.
Later on, though, enter-
prises began to accumu-
late debts consciously,
hoping that the govern-
ment would forego these
debts. Increasing interest
rates became another
motive for the utilization
of debts as commercial
credits
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At the same time, these debts gradually transformed into
strategic arrears, as defined by Perotti17. Enterprises con-
tinued to ship their products, leaving aside the question of
payment. Moreover, they often postponed paying bills con-
sciously, hoping that the government would be able to credit
them and solve the problem of non-payments. In reality, the
government followed this pattern and was giving firms ever-
green credits, while the actual problem remained unsolved 
moreover, arrears began to grow even more rapidly.
Depreciated hryvnia savings kept in the banking system dur-
ing hyperinflation in 1992-94, as well as simultaneously in-
creased rates on bank loans (as a result of weak financial dis-
cipline in budget-subsidized enterprises, the default risk in-
creased sharply) created the ground for expensive and unob-
tainable bank credits. This became one of the motives that
pre-determined the extensive utilization of commercial
(goods) credits among enterprises.
Other barriers to the successful functioning of the market
economy in Ukraine only facilitated the process of accumu-
lating unpaid bills on goods and services. Soon, their volume
reached one of the highest levels among other CEE transition
economies. By the end of 1996, the total mutual debt of
goods, operations and services between enterprises ac-
counted for 54% of GDP, while by the end of 1997 this num-
ber increased up to 71% of GDP. The share of outstanding
debts in total debt grew from 79% in 1996 to 77% in 199718.
The size of total debt did not settle down in 1998, though it
increased less rapidly: the average monthly increase in the
stock of debts was 2.4%19.
                                                                
17 Perotti, Enriko C. Collusive Arrears in Transition Economies,
London School of Economics, Financial Markets Group Discussion Paper,
N0. 198, 1994.
18 Total and outstanding debts of goods and services are accounts
payable that come from the reports of enterprises, fixed as unpaid
goods, operations and services which were received. Outstanding
debt is a debt that was not paid according to the terms defined by
the contract. Entrepreneurs define outstanding debt themselves in
statistics reports that they submit to the State Statistics Committee.
19 The average increase in debts in nominal terms to the previous
month for the period of February and September exclusively.
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Few bad debts exist between enterprises
Today, mutual debts between enterprises are a usual thing
with developed economies of the West. Therefore, one could
expect that such debts might appear in Ukraine during the
period of transition. In several countries, the volume of
commercial credits that enterprises open to each other is
larger than the size of loans received from banks. At that, the
size of commercial credit remains roughly unchanged, while
outstanding commercial credit usually ranges between 30-
60% (Alfandari and Mark E. Schaffer, 1996).
As for outstanding debts, they distinguish between late debts
 the payment of which is postponed, and bad debts  those
that are problematic and will not probably be redeemed if the
enterprise is not restructured. The 76% share of outstanding
debts in the Ukrainian economy reported for the first half of
1998, which is larger than the respective indicator in devel-
oped and other transition economies, may only prove that
the share of bad debts is high.
The Ukrainian system of bookkeeping lacks this debt classifi-
cation, which makes it difficult to calculate the share of bad
debts. The only way that allows for defining this indicator is
to base the evaluation on the analysis of the outstanding debt
structure by terms, which was executed by the State Statistics
Committee for the period from January 1, 1997 to January 1,
1998. These estimations are approximate and one should
utilize them carefully.
Outstanding accounts payable by enterprises
as of end of year
0
5
10
15
20
25
1996  (total
UAH 34,7 billion
Up to  3 months
from 3 months to
1 year
from 1 to 2 years
over 2 years
1997  (total
UAH 46,8 billion
Source: State Statistics Committee
Today, mutual debts
between enterprises are a
usual thing with devel-
oped economies of the
West. They distinguish
between late and bad
debts. Mainly, mutual
debts between enterprises
in Ukraine are late debts
that may be redeemed.
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The probability is rather high that debts with one year of ma-
turity are accumulated by enterprises that suffer from the
hard financial situation and cannot be redeemed in the me-
dium term. Therefore, the approximate volume of bad debts
is the stock of debts with one year of maturity. By January 1,
1998 the stock of bad debts amounted to UAH 10 billion,
which is 15% of the total debt. This number is the lower
bound of bad debt share in the total debt, as bad liabilities
are also a part of debts that have 3 months-1 year of maturity.
Therefore, the share of bad debts must exceed 15%.
It is worth emphasizing that in 1998, outstanding debt in-
creased more rapidly in the share of debts with maturity up to
3 months (UAH 8.4 billion, or 70% of the increase in out-
standing debt). However, in this category of liabilities, the
increase in bad debts is significantly smaller, as enterprises
usually redeem them. As a result, the increase in the stock of
debt with 3 months  1 year of maturity is insignificant20.
This fact proves that Ukrainian enterprises learned how to
differentiate between bad and diligent customers, and
moreover, they do not work under soft budget constraints21
and are not willing to give commercial credits to unverified
firms. On this issue, Ukrainian enterprises follow the behav-
ior pattern that is common in other transition economies,
such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland etc. This idea is
developed in the work of Mark Schaffer22, who argues that
commercial credit in transition economies is not easy to get
or that it is not restricted.
With regards to Ukraine, this fact affirms the survey con-
ducted by the experts of TACIS and NBU in 199623. Accord-
ing to this survey, enterprises are very careful about selling
goods on credit. 89% of the surveyed enterprises made par-
                                                                
20 Outstanding debt with 3 month-1 year of maturity decreased by
UAH 0.5 billion in 1997.
21 Kornai, a Hungarian economist, for describing the socialist
economy, introduced the term soft budget constraints. Later, this
term became a widely used category in the analysis of market and
transition economies.
22 Schaffer, Mark E. Do Firms in Transition Have Soft Budget
Constraints? A Reconsideration of Concepts and Evidence, CERT
Paper, December 1997.
23 The survey was conducted in July-November 1996. 467 managers
were surveyed in different oblasts of Ukraine.
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tial or full prepayments. Additionally, 64% of enterprises se-
cure their agreements.
Government allows for creating debts
As soon as the government gave up direct financing, direc-
tors of loss-making enterprises started to utilize barter opera-
tions and accumulate arrears. Such enterprises were able to
continue their operations only through postponing payments
to the budget and to their employees.
The government, resisting the bankruptcy of loss-making en-
terprises and maintaining the practice of writing off debts,
only stimulates a further increase in the stock of strategic
debts. Managers use such policy by not decreasing their debts
and hoping that the government will not change ownership
and continue financing. In fact, the government implicitly
supports unprofitable firms that do not set targets at maxi-
mized profits, which is common for market economies.
The majority of such enterprises are concentrated in the ag-
ricultural sector and in the coal-mining industry, which are
strategically important sectors of the economy. For example,
the number of accounts payable in Ukraines agricultural
sector exceeded accounts receivable by 130% as of October 1,
1998. The share of outstanding payable bills amounted to
93% of the total accounts due for goods, operations and serv-
ices.
The outstanding debt is also dependent inversely to the size
of an enterprise. Small enterprises held the smallest share of
outstanding debts (43% in enterprises with a number of em-
ployees up to 100), while the share of overdue payments in
enterprises with over five thousand employees was 93%.
In fact, directors of large enterprises blackmail the govern-
ment and their partners with possible social disorders, while
small enterprises remain too weak to stand against their in-
fluence.
A long way to debt crisis
The hope that these enterprises will redeem their debts (in
case the sides do not agree upon barter operations) is inop-
portune. Although numerous enterprises plead for their
money to be returned in arbitration court (the decisions of
which are usually positive for the complainant), they cannot
receive compensation, as their debtors do not keep money on
The government allows
strategic sectors of the
economy and large enter-
prises to create bad debts,
but impedes the change
in ownership and credits
them.
Redeeming debts through
the court and bankruptcy
procedures is impossible.
There are two reasons for
that: (1) preserving Kar-
toteka 2 that defines the
priority of payments
made by indebted enter-
prises, and (2) the ab-
sence of an efficient
bankruptcy mechanism
that would allow for
changing the owner of an
entity
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bank accounts24. Therefore, the latter are put on so-called
Kartoteka 2 after the Arbitration court ruling regarding the
obligatory write-off of debts. Unpaid tax bills are also kept in
this Kartoteka. As soon as money enters the debtors account,
authorized banks distribute it following established rules25.
According to them, payments between enterprises are not
given top priority, and an enterprise has no right to establish
the order of paying out its arrears to creditors.
The kartoteka system mentioned above allows loss-making
enterprises to survive. It is clear that enterprises put on the
system could not be interested in paying off their debts in
cash, therefore they would avoid this form of payment and
further accumulate arrears26.
The kartoteka system should be abolished if the state wants to
solve the problems of debts and barter operations. At the
same time, this step should be simultaneously followed by
other activities aimed toward economic recovery. In particu-
lar, one of these activities should be the development of an
efficient bankruptcy mechanism. If the kartoteka system were
cancelled by itself, it would merely result in the reduction of
payments to the budget and would not improve the discipline
of payment.
The current bankruptcy mechanism is not efficiently working
in Ukraine, and therefore, bankruptcy is a rare practice,
given the significantly high volume of debt. In general, credi-
tors are not used to initiating bankruptcy processes. Accord-
ing to the above mentioned survey, 76% of those surveyed
                                                                
24 According to the survey, 24% of respondents called for their debts
through the arbitration court, and 34% of complainants resorted to
the court at least several times. 62% of the courts decisions were
positive for complainants.
25 Since October 1 1998, according to the decision of the NBU,
payments are distributed by the following scheme: 10% of receipts
are allocated on the obligatory pension insurance; 15% of the sum
received on the main account of the enterprise for the previous
month is directed for servicing emergent needs of an enterprise
(wage payments, other similar payments, and all necessary taxes);
5% may be used for paying debts to other enterprises. 50% of the
rest of the sum is directed for paying the outstanding wage arrears,
while another 50%  for paying taxes and tax arrears.
26 Barter payments are widely spread in the Ukrainian economy. For
example, during 9 months of 1998 barter inter-payments between
enterprises accounted for 43.3% of all payments in the industrial
sector.
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never exercised their right to declare their debtors bankrupt,
17% of those surveyed sometimes exercise this right, and
only 7% were used to initiating bankruptcy processes when
they want to receive their credits back.
To conclude, the main reason for the increase in bad debts
among enterprises is the absence of an efficient bankruptcy
mechanism that would allow for changing the owner of an
entity. Not given clearly defined responsibilities for their debt
service, enterprises would block any attempts by the govern-
ment to solve this problem successfully.
Another source of debts  fictitious budget
Unreal budget expenditures and the governments attempts
to maximize its revenues negatively impact the liquidity of
enterprises and create improper stimuli for economic agents.
Thus, fiscal policy is the other reason for the increase in the
stock of debt. At the same time, the negative impact on effi-
cient enterprises is more severe than that on loss-making
ones, as the latter enjoy a solid lobby and do not merely pay
taxes.
A government attempting to execute a fictitious budget often
infringes upon payment discipline on the side of the state
itself. Gathering modest budget revenue and the pressing
need of financing social and other liabilities, the Ministry of
Finance does not precipitate the timely VAT reimbursement.
Problems that enterprises face with respect to VAT surplus
management, provoke them to avoid the creation of such
surplus. For example, enterprises are better off when instead
of barter agreements concluded for 3-month barter opera-
tions, they write out a simple agreement and place the cre-
ated debt until all the payments are carried out.
Another negative consequence of such tax policy is the high
real interest rate which fluctuated around 43% in the first
half of 1998. While the government remains the main debtor
in Ukraines financial market and threatens the market with
emissions needed to finance its fictitious budget, the interest
rate will remain high and will result in a significant natural
level of debt in Ukraine, as increasing trade credit will merely
result from the high price of bank credits. Thus, according to
the data of the mentioned survey, 74% of enterprises avoided
bank crediting because of the high interest rates.
Fictitious budget creates
improper stimuli for eco-
nomic agents and often
results in infringe of the
payment discipline by the
state itself. Imbalances in
the budget preserve the
real interest rate at high
levels
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Why are mutual arrears between enterprises dan-
gerous? How do we deal with them?
An accumulation of debts leads to avoiding tax payments and
increases the domestic debt, while the government tries to
rake money for transfer payments.
Therefore, there is the need to implement a policy that
would lessen the volume of accumulated debt and assist in
dealing with the problem of bad outstanding debts. At that,
the policy aimed at decreasing arrears should eliminate the
direct causes of them instead of fighting against arrears by
themselves.
Common recommendations on how to fight against non-
payments are (1) measures for reducing existing debts, and
(2) measures for preventing further increase in them.
The most complicated task is to prevent increases in the stock
of debt. First, the government must schedule payments to the
budget and inter-payments between enterprises as well as in-
stall the cut point date after which no receipts would be tol-
erated. Therefore, there is a pressing need to adopt a strict
law for bankruptcy similar to that adopted in Hungary in
1991. It was called draconic law27, as it envisioned severe regu-
lations for non-payers. Then, the share of bad debt in the
economy was significant, and there were expectations for the
economic collapse after implementation of this law. How-
ever, this forecast did not confirm, that economic activities in
Hungary shrank slightly. Otherwise, the draconic law allowed
rapid transition to the market principles, which was critical
for the development of a competitive economic sector.
At the same time, the reform of the fiscal system should be
implemented. Reduction in budget consumption and budget
deficit, restriction of the government loans in financial mar-
kets, as well as abandonment of the idea to cover budget ex-
penditures through additional emission would result in lower
interest rates and cheaper bank credits. These changes would
stimulate enterprises to go to banks instead of exercising
commercial credits. An important step that would prevent
from a rise in the debt stock is to reform the tax system, re-
ducing the existing tax burden and making tax procedures
more transparent and easy-to-follow.
                                                                
27 Tarafas, Imre. The Expansion of Foreign-owned banks and Their
Role in the Hungarian Banking System, Paper presented at the Confe-
rence at NBU, November 1998.
Arrears reduce budget
revenue. Policy for fight-
ing against non-
payments must concern
their roots and prevent
increases in arrears
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After the proper market stimuli to prevent from further
problematic debt accumulation are introduced, it is not
technically difficult to deal with the existing debt stock. The
share of bad debts would be automatically reduced after a
working procedure for an enterprises liquidation and bank-
ruptcy is introduced.
Another mechanism for dealing with the debt problem is to
securitize debts: an enterprise issues bonds that cover the
sum of its debt. At the date of maturity, it should pay off the
sum or convert bonds in shares of the enterprise. Arrears of
enterprises that are not set out for privatization may be con-
verted in T-bills28.
Budget arrears grow more rapidly
Inter-payment debts between enterprises and tax arrears
emerged almost simultaneously. By the end of 1997, the
overall sum of payments due to the state and local budgets,
arrears of extra-budget payments and insurance amounted to
UAH 14.8 billion, of which UAH 12.4 billion (or 84%) were
outstanding bills29. They accounted for 16% of GDP in 1997.
Over the course of 1998, tax arrears continued to grow and
amounted to UAH 22.5 billion on October 1, 1998, of which
UAH 18 billion (or 80%) were outstanding bills. However,
the numbers do not reflect the real situation, as many tax ar-
rears were written off or restructured.
The absence of deliberate steps on the side of state authori-
ties not only supports loss-making enterprises, but provokes
other firms to avoid paying taxes. In fact, the government
executes the policy of soft budget constraints that involves
writing-off and restructuring debts, little intention to re-
organize those enterprises that create tax arrears. This policy
also results in tax payment clearance between the budgets
and enterprises.
Over the recent year and a half the government resorted five
times to debts restructuring or writing off. One fifth of them
was formulated as a law of Ukraine of November 20, 1998,
                                                                
28 Bigman and Leite (1993).
29 Arrears to the consolidated budget include arrears of VAT,
corporate tax, other taxes and payments to the central and local
budgets. Off-budget payments are collections of Innovation and
Traffic Funds; insurance arrears are outstanding payments to the
Pension Fund, Fund for Social Insurance and Employment Fund.
For 9 months of 1998,
increase in the debts to
the budget amounted to
UAH 8 billion, or over
50%. However, the ac-
tual situation is even
worse, as debts have been
restructured and written
off many times. This
impedes structural
changes in enterprises
and stimulates a further
accumulation of debts.
The government also
supports inefficient en-
terprises by the official
clearance procedure that
allows overpricing of
products
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allowing postponing tax payments in the coal-mining sector.
Though, it is a dying cause to expect that the coal-mining sec-
tor would redeem its debts in the future, as the branch re-
ports permanent losses and does not undergo any efficient
reforms. Before that, the government restructured and wrote
off tax debts in the agricultural and military-industrial sec-
tors.
Debt structure of enterprises
accounting for UAH 22.5 billion as of 01.10.1998
Insurance
28%
(UAH 6,2 billion)
To
consolidated
budget
61%
(UAH 13,9 billion)
Off-
budget operations
11%
(UAH 2,4 billion)
Source: State Statistics Committee
Such practice impedes restructuring in those branches that
receive implicit subsidies in the form of written off tax debt.
Restructuring arrears also has no positive results. Thus, ac-
cording to the law of Ukraine On Restructuring and Writing
Off Tax Arrears of Defaulters as of March 31, 1997, dated
June 5, 1997, the sum restructured and written off amounted
to UAH 5 billion. The starting date to redeem the restruc-
tured tax arrears was appointed as January 1, 1998, but in
fact, the stock of tax debts continues to grow30.
The government policy for restructuring and writing off tax
debts does not solve the problem of arrears, as it does not
include a direct message for entrepreneurs that further at-
tempts to avoid tax payments will result in shutting down
their firms. Again, such policy creates strategic arrears, as
                                                                
30 Country Economic Memorandum on fiscal policy conducted by
the International Centre for Policy Studies.
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enterprises start giving up paying taxes consciously, as they
expect the government to cancel their tax debts.
Despite permanent restructuring and write-offs, three
months of outstanding tax arrears and other mandatory pay-
ments accounted for 51% of all debt as of January 1, 1998.
The respective debt between enterprises was somewhat
smaller and amounted to 41%. Therefore, tax arrears con-
tinue to grow, although tax authorities improve their control-
ling functions. The problem is that bad debts prevail in tax
arrears, which would not disappear until the enterprise is not
restructured and announced bankrupt.
The problem of clearances has the same roots with the prob-
lem of tax debts. Ineffective enterprises receive support
mainly through clearances with budgets of all levels, in other
words, they supply budgets and budget-supported organiza-
tions directly with goods and services or receive goods from
their debtors and deliver these goods to the budgets.
Through the mechanism of clearances the state budget re-
ceived UAH 1.4 billion (18.9% of the revenue), while local
budgets raised UAH 2.2 billion (27.2% of the revenue) for
the period 9 months of 199831.
As goods projected for clearance operations are usually over-
priced, this advantage is widely practiced. Moreover, clear-
ances add to the increase in debts to the budget, as they may
exist only if debts are spread.
If the government wants to deal successfully with tax arrears
and raise more revenues to the budget, it should abandon
clearance mechanisms, and practice writing off and restruc-
turing tax debts. All enterprises of any branch should be
treated equally. If the government decides to subsidize a cer-
tain enterprise, it should envision and fix this explicit assis-
tance in the budget.
To solve the problem of tax arrears efficiently, every state or
governmentally controlled enterprise must be restructured
individually. Before its debts are restructured or written off,
the managers must submit very precise plans for reorganizing
their enterprise and meet certain conditions32.
                                                                
31 Country Economic Memorandum on fiscal policy conducted by
the International Centre for Policy Studies
32 Bigman and Leite (1993).
Paralyzed Enterprises
Policy Studies, January 199928
Debts to employees allow for
preserving working places
Wage arrears are even more problematic than tax arrears and
mutual debts between enterprises discussed above. While
enterprises refrain from increasing their bad debts and have
the opportunities to restructure or write off tax debts, they
have to search for some other way to deal with wage arrears.
Very often those employed in insolvent enterprises find it
impossible to give up working, as a loss of jobs and the ab-
sence of an alternative employee threaten them. Therefore,
the share of outstanding debt of wage arrears is the highest
among the three types of arrears discussed in this paper. By
January 1, 1998 the share of outstanding debt in mutual pay-
ment arrears between enterprises accounts for 72%, out-
standing tax arrears 84%, while the share of outstanding debt
in overall wage arrears reached 85%.
At the beginning of 1998 overall wage arrears accumulated by
enterprises equaled UAH 5.3 billion, or 5.7% of GDP calcu-
lated for 1997. The share of outstanding payments in total
wages due reached 85% by the end of 1997. Moreover, the
structure of outstanding debt was the worst among the three
types of debt and the share of wage arrears with 3 months of
maturity equaled 73% of the total wage debt33.
By October 1, 1998 wage arrears grew up to UAH 6.58 billion,
in which the share of outstanding debt was UAH 5.58 billion,
or 87%. An 88% increase in outstanding debt during January-
September 1998 falls on debts which have over 3 months of
maturity (according to data reported by the NBU). There-
fore, the structure of outstanding debt worsened and the
share of outstanding wage arrears with maturity over 3
months reached 76% of all debt.
A continual decrease in production was not accompanied by
the corresponding reduction in the number of employed.
This led to an accumulation of excessive labor force in some
enterprises. According to official statistics, GDP fell by 54%
during 1991-1997, while the rate of employment decreased
only by 10%.
                                                                
33 In the structure of outstanding receivables the shares of mutual
arrears between enterprises, tax arrears and wage debt accounted
for 41%, 51% and 73% respectively among the bills with the age
over 3 months.
The share of wage arrears
in the total debt of pay-
ments is the largest. Re-
fusing non-paying work,
a worker becomes unem-
ployed having no oppor-
tunity to find a better job.
Many inefficient enter-
prises cannot pay wages,
as they have an excessive
number of employed. The
government on its side
should set its priorities 
to protect the people of
Ukraine or subsidize par-
ticular loss-making en-
terprises through soft
budget constraints.
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Wage arrears by structure
As of 01.01.1998, wage arrears equaled UAH 6.42billion (budget-
supported agencies  UAH 0.98 billion, other entities  UAH5.44 billion)
1-2 months
7,6%
Up to month
7,6%
2-3 months
8,7%
Over 3 months
76%
Source: NBU (Holos Ukrainy newspaper, December 8, 1998)
Although the average wage declined in Ukraine, enterprises
started laying off workers on forced leave, not preserving
their wages or lessening the hours and days of work34. How-
ever, wage arrears continued growing. Even the introduction
of barter payments was not effective, although wages paid out
as barter made a significant share in the wage fund: for ex-
ample, in September 1998 enterprises paid UAH 2 billion in
wages in the form of barter, which amounted to 18.4% of the
monthly wage fund. The wages paid out in barter is lower
than the actual salary attached to the position, as barter goods
proposed to workers are overpriced. A worker chooses lower
wages in exchange for being employed. At the same time,
enterprises regulate demand and supply through the price
mechanism, leaving aside the quantity factor,  i.e. giving out
lower wages or failing to pay them on time.
Such protective behavior of enterprises lessened the problem
of wage arrears but did not eliminate it, as most enterprises
are insolvent and cannot pay their workers. People have no
chance to find paying jobs, as there are no such jobs in
                                                                
34 Today, this remains a usual practice. Thus, number of employed
that were on forced leave during January-September 1998 was 2.5
billion people, which is 20% of employed in the real sector (of this
number, 0.74 billion people did not work over one month). The
number of those working short hours amounted to 2 billion people,
or 16% of the employed.
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Ukraine, and the situation in the labor market is getting
worse. To deal with this problem, it is necessary to eliminate
the influence of general factors for the debts growing. In par-
ticular, the structure of employment must change and work-
ers must receive a chance to occupy new working places.
The government, on its side should set its priorities  to pro-
tect the people of Ukraine or subsidize particular loss-making
enterprises through soft budget constraints. Passive policy in
the labor market must change into a determined and active
one, complementing mere unemployment benefits with
other more effective measures. Creating new working places
must become priority, and therefore, the government should
think of reducing tax pressure both on a particular enterprise
and the economy as a whole.
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Beyond a Bailout: Time to Face
Reality about Russias Virtual
Economy35
Clifford G. Gaddy, Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies
Barry W. Ickes, Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University
In 1998, American researchers invented a new term for the Russian economy,
which is virtual economy, which can be easily applied to Ukraine. Virtual
economy distorts major economic indicators, as it does not operate with real
money and real prices. Having deep roots, it is also widely supported by the
public. As a result, nobody benefits from the abolishment of the virtual economy
in the short term, while in the long run this radical step would obviously lead to
positive changes.
he proximate causes of Russia's current financial crisis 
the government's large budget deficit and the inability to
service its debt, especially short-term dollar liabilities  are
clear. The steps required to solve these short-term liquidity
problems would seem to be equally straightforward and are
being widely proposed. For its part, the Russian government
is being called upon to reduce the budget deficit by collect-
ing more taxes and cutting back on government spending.
The international financial organizations and the Western
nations, on the other hand, are being urged to craft an emer-
gency loan package that would possibly include funds to sta-
bilize the immediate financial situation but certainly a pro-
gram to restructure Russia's debt for the longer term. These
measures, it is argued, would allow the reformist government
to get back to the business of market reform.
The idea that Russia's economic problems can be remedied
by such measures is wrong. It is premised on a fundamental
misunderstanding of the Russian economy, but one which is
a near-consensus view. It goes something like this. Russia is a
largely privatized economy whose early success in market re-
form has been slowed by widespread corruption, crime, and
incompetence. The explosion of barter and non-payments is
due to inept and immoral enterprise management. Poor tax
                                                                
35 The article was first released in Foreign Affairs, October 1998
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collection has produced a weak state. Overcoming these ob-
stacles is a formidable challenge. But if they can be sur-
mounted, movement towards the market can continue.
In fact, most of the Russian economy has not been making
progress toward the market, nor even marking time. It is ac-
tively moving away from the market. Over the past six years of
"radical reform," Russian companies, especially those in the
core manufacturing sectors, have indeed changed the way
they operate. Only, they have not done so in order to join the
market but rather to protect themselves against it. What has
emerged in Russia is something that arguably qualifies as a
new type of economic system with its own rules of behavior
and criteria for success and failure.
We call the new system Russia's "Virtual Economy," because it
is based on illusion, or pretense, about almost every impor-
tant parameter of the economy: prices, sales, wages, taxes,
and budgets. At its heart is the ultimate pretense that the
Russian economy is larger than it really is. It is this pretense
that allows for larger government, and larger expenditures,
than Russia can afford. It is the cause of the web of non-
payments and fiscal crisis from which Russia seemingly can-
not emerge.
Below, we suggest the extent of the Virtual Economy and ex-
plain its roots. We also show how it helps explain some fea-
tures of the current political process in Russia. The Virtual
Economy, we argue, is robust, deep-rooted, and enjoys strong
popular support. For those reasons, it has defined a new "re-
form" agenda for Russia that is already setting the tone for
the current government. It will most certainly do so for a fu-
ture one.
The Virtual Economy presents the West with difficult choices
regarding continued support of Russian economic transition.
The principal motivation for providing more emergency
funds for Russia, a "bailout," seems to be a belief not only that
more money is required to preserve social and political stabil-
ity, but also that it can be given with strings that will induce
more reform. We believe that the opposite is true: the inevi-
table outcome of a bailout will be to support the Virtual
Economy, a system that is non-market in nature and whose
inefficiency will ensure continued economic decline and fu-
ture crises. At best, a bailout will merely postpone the day of
reckoning. When that day comes, the economic conse-
quences and political backlash will be even stronger than they
might be today.
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Reality and Pretense
The widespread pretense regarding the Russian economy is
apparent if one looks closely at economic statistics. The na-
tional statistics agency reported a growth in industrial output
for 1997 (as it did a slight increase in GDP). After eight years
of decline, industrial output was up by 1.9%. But it's very mis-
leading to stop there. Real profits in industry were down by
5% last year. By now, the share of industrial enterprises that
reported losses is almost half  47.3% to be exact  up from
less than 27% two years ago.
Something else that reflects the economy's true state is the
level of fixed capital formation. It dropped again last year, for
the seventh year in a row (and continues to decline this year).
In 1997, the overall level of capital investment in the econ-
omy's production sectors (industry, agriculture, transporta-
tion, and communications) was 17% of what it was in 1990. In
the core manufacturing sector of metal-working and engi-
neering products, the volume of real spending on plant and
equipment in 1997 was no more than 5.3% of the 1990 level.
Very few negative signals are being sent about this state of
affairs. Bankruptcy is still a rarity. There were more corporate
bankruptcies in the U.S. in the past four weeks than the en-
tire last year in Russia. It would thus appear that despite the
obvious lack of success, nothing is changing in Russian indus-
try. Yet, that is not true, either. The companies are not with-
ering away, or are even merely moribund. They ended the
year of 1997 with more workers than at the beginning.
On top of all this is the notorious "nonpayments" or "pay-
ments arrears" crisis. The way this story is reported is a famil-
iar one: The enterprises don't pay their suppliers; they don't
pay their workers; they don't pay their taxes. While the non-
payment of taxes and wages attracts media attention, it is in a
sense not the real story. Payments are being made, just not in
actual money. The share of barter in payments among all in-
dustrial enterprises in Russia is now above 50%. Last year,
40% of all taxes paid to the Russian federal government were
in nonmonetary form. The degree of nonmonetization of
local and regional budgets is even higher.
The phenomena described above are most prevalent in the
large enterprise sector. A Russian government commission
last year reported that the country's largest companies con-
ducted 73% of all their business in the form of barter and
other nonmonetary forms of settlement. Even more remark-
able was the way these large enterprises dealt with the tax
The widespread pretense
regarding the Russian
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the economic statistics on
industrial output and
the level of fixed capital
formation. Losses of en-
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authorities. To the federal budget they remitted 80% of the
taxes they owed  not a terribly bad figure  but the propor-
tion paid in cash was only 8%.
The following sentences from the report sum up the commis-
sion's own conclusions about the current Russian economy:
An economy is emerging where prices are charged which no one pays in
cash; where no one pays anything on time; where huge mutual debts
are created that also can't be paid off in reasonable periods of time;
where wages are declared and not paid; and so on. [...] [This creates]
illusory, or virtual earnings, which in turn lead to unpaid, or virtual
fiscal obligations, [with business conducted at] nonmarket, or virtual
prices.
In short, what has emerged is a "Virtual Economy."
The Roots of the Virtual Economy
The roots of the Virtual Economy lay in the largely unre-
formed industrial sector inherited from the Soviet period. At
the heart of the phenomenon are the large number of enter-
prises that still produce goods but destroy value. This is a sec-
tor of the economy that has survived six years of market re-
form. The reasons are complex, but the most important is
that in Russia today enterprises can operate without paying
their bills. This is possible because value is redistributed to
them from other sectors of the economy. One way this is
done is through tax arrears, which are in effect the continua-
tion of budget subsidies in a different form. More important,
however, is direct redistribution of value to value-subtractors
from the value-producing sectors of the economy, primarily
the resources sector.
It is important to understand the continuity with the past that
is involved here. The Soviet economy appeared to be a large
industrial economy. In fact, industry in the Soviet economy
was subsidized by under-priced raw materials and insufficient
charges for capital. The economy appeared to have a large
manufacturing sector that produced value; in fact, manufac-
turing destroyed value, but this was masked by arbitrary pric-
ing. The roots of the Virtual Economy lie in the maintenance
of this pretense.
The roots of the virtual
economy lay in the largely
unreformed industrial
sector inherited from the
Soviet period. Enterprises
still produce goods but
destroy value, which is
redistributed to them from
other sectors of the econ-
omy
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A Simple Accounting Model
The simplest way to understand today's Russian economy is to
imagine that it consists of only four sectors. First, there is the
household sector. It supplies labor. Second, there is a gov-
ernment, or budget, sector that transfers tax receipts to the
households. Third, there is a value-adding production sector
(we call it "Gazprom" for short). We designate these three,
respectively, "H" (for households), "B" (for budgets), and "G"
(for Gazprom). Finally, there is a fourth sector, a value-
subtracting manufacturing sector, "M", that encompasses all
the rest of the economy (speaking somewhat loosely- but not
very).
Think of M as a single plant that takes 100 rubles of labor
from H and 100 rubles of gas from G and makes a product
worth 100 rubles. It subtracts, or destroys 100 rubles worth of
value. But it pretends that it is a value-adder. To do that, it
overprices its output. It claims it is worth not 100, but 300.
And everyone else accepts that pretense. They do so because
they can use the overpriced output in barter trade with one
another (where prices have no meaning) or to pay their own
taxes.
M pays G for the gas by giving it one-third of its final product,
claiming it is worth 100 rubles. (In market terms, it is worth
only 33 1/3.) That is fine with G, since it merely passes the
product on to B in fulfillment of its tax obligation. (We as-
sume a 100% tax rate on value-added.) M, of course, pays its
own taxes  100 rubles  in kind as well.
Problems begin to arise only in respect to the households. H
expects to be paid 100 for its labor, but cannot accept in-kind
payment. It needs (at least some) cash. But the cash value of
M's remaining product is only 33 1/3. Hence, "wage arrears."
This model of course is highly stylized. But despite its simplis-
tic nature, it is remarkable how much of the contemporary
Russian economy it manages to capture. Beginning with the
scheme outlined above and making a few additional assump-
tions, the model generates nearly the entire Virtual Economy:
not only the wage arrears, but also the unrealistic budget, the
pension arrears, and the apparent increased output.
Equally important, the four-sector accounting model imme-
diately suggests the utility or futility of various policy meas-
ures. Take, for instance, the IMF-dictated tax collection
crackdown. The Russian government has been under pres-
sure to increase the amount of cash to the budget and is
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therefore demanding that enterprises settle their tax debts in
cash, not in kind. The model makes it clear that such an ap-
proach can only mean shifting a given amount of value  too
small already to satisfy claims by both budgets (taxes) and
workers (wages)from one recipient to the other. One's gain
is the other's loss. If taxes are paid, wages won't be.
That is what has happened at regular intervals in recent years,
including in the first quarter of this year. In January through
March, Russia's tax service increased its intake of cash by
slightly over five billion rubles (after accounting for infla-
tion). During that same period, enterprises' debts to their
workers for overdue wages rose by almost exactly ... five bil-
lion rubles.
Why the Russians Prefer it
Obviously, the kind of system described above could not ex-
ist, or at least could not long persist, in a market economy.
But it does exist in Russia, and seems to be getting stronger
each day. To understand why the Virtual Economy is so ro-
bust, let us again turn to the stylized four-sector model to see
what would happen if it were to be terminated. We can com-
pare the apparent outcome of the Virtual Economy to what is
really happening beneath the pretense. All that is necessary is
to assume that no one, including the value-subtracting manu-
facturer, pretends that its final product is worth anything
other than the 100 it actually is.
The first result is that M would have to report a loss of 100
instead of a profit of 100. It therefore would have no tax obli-
gation. But with sales revenue of only 100, M could not pay
both G (to whom it owes 100 for gas) and H (to whom it owes
wages of 100). It would have to apportion the 100 it does have
between them. Assume it pays an equal amount to each: 50 to
H and 50 to G. M thus has wage arrears of 50 and inter-
enterprise arrears of 50. (In fact, these arrears numbers are
arbitrary. The sum will equal 100, but it can be divided in
different proportions between G and H.)
G in turn remits to B its only earnings, the 50 it receives from
M. This leaves G with tax arrears of 50. B's only revenues are
what it receives from G, since M has no value added. B then
transfers to H the 50 it received from G. This still leaves
budget arrears (pension arrears, say) of 50.
Comparing the Macro Indicators, Virtual and Real
Let us imagine what
would happen if the vir-
tual economy were to be
terminated. On all
counts, the Virtual Econ-
omy's aggregate perform-
ance indicators (sales,
profits, GDP, output)
look better than the real
variant's. If virtual
economy terminates,
nominal payments from
the budget will reduce
and new arrears will
arise.  Most important is
that the value-
subtracting enterprise
would become loss mak-
ing and must be shut
down
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This exercise could be pursued in greater detail, but the pic-
ture is starting to become clear. It is useful to summarize the
results in the form of a set of imaginary national accounts.
Table 1 compares how it appears that the economy is per-
forming in the Virtual Economy regime with how it is actually
performing. On all counts, the Virtual Economy's aggregate
performance indicators (sales, profits, GDP, output) look
better than the real variant's.
Comparative Indicators for the Virtual Economy
and the Underlying Real Economy
Virtual Real
Total Sales 400 200
Total Profits 200 0
Profit rate 50% 0%
Total value-added (=GDP) 300 100
Industrial output 400 200
Budget size
Planned 200 100
As implemented 67 50
Household income
Accrued 300 200
Actual 100 100
Arrears
Wage 67 50
Inter-enterprise None 50
Tax None 50
Budget 133 50
The item in Table 1 on the size of the budget deserves special
comment. The planned budget is equal to the total taxes due
and total spending based on those expected revenues. In the
real variant it is only half as large as in the virtual variant.
What does that mean? If we assume, for instance, that the
budget transfers to households represent pensions, then this
means that nominal pensions are cut by 50%. In reality, of
course, nothing changes. In fact, the government fulfills its
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promises to a greater degree in the real variant (it promised
100 and delivered 50, as opposed to promising 200 and de-
livering 67.) Nevertheless, the perception will be that pen-
sions have been cut in half! And it is the pretense that counts.
The arrears picture differs as well. Total arrears are the same
in this numerical example. But note that two new types of
arrears arise when the Virtual Economy's pretense is elimi-
nated. Now, G has a tax debt, and M has inter-enterprise ar-
rears to G. The web of mutual indebtedness has become even
more entangled than in the original case.
Perhaps more important than any aggregate indicator, how-
ever, is how elimination of the Virtual Economy would affect
the individual enterprise, M. The Virtual Economy masks the
non-viability of the value-subtracting manufacturer. In the
Virtual Economy, M appears to add value of 100. In the real
variant, M is a clear loss-maker.
In sum, none of the participants in the Virtual Economy gain
by its elimination. Any attempt to shift from the pretend vir-
tual world to the honest real world would be unpopular, to
put it mildly. It would mean slashing pensions, irritating
Gazprom by branding it as a tax delinquent and demanding
more taxes from it, and threatening the bankruptcy of the
manufacturing enterprise and complete loss of jobs and
wages for the population.
This in turn emphasizes the key point brought out by the
model. The Virtual Economy arises because of the combina-
tion of two fundamental facts: (1) most of the Russian econ-
omy (especially its manufacturing sector) is value-subtracting,
while (2) most participants in the economy pretend that it is
not. Barter, tax arrears, and other non-monetary modes of
payment turn out to be the main mechanism used to sustain
the pretense. The pretense is what causes all the nonpayment
difficulties. There is less value produced than there are
claims on it and commitments to it.
Desperate for Cash
The relationship between the non-cash Virtual Economy and
the cash-based market economy is a curious one. To some
extent, the system described above is driven by an active ef-
fort to avoid cash. Cash transactions expose the pretense.
There are other reasons to avoid cash. Cash is costly to earn
and costly to keep. The presence of a lot of cash in an enter-
prise might make it more likely that the tax authorities would
refuse to accept noncash offsets. Cash is also liable to be
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"taxed" by the ubiquitous protection rackets in Russia. Never-
theless, the effort to avoid cash earnings only kicks in at a cer-
tain point, once a certain level of cash is obtained. That
minimum level is called the cash constraint. Until that level is
reached, cash is needed inside the system, and it is needed
desperately.
Most urgently, the value-subtracting enterprise has to be able
to sell its product for cash in order to pay wages. This ex-
plains the ironic feature of the system that while it is itself a
nonmarket system, it requires the existence of the market. It
is only the market that allows some of the economy's product
to be realized for the cash needed to pay workers. Some of
the product can be sold inside Russia. But the main source of
cash is outside, on the world market.
Since 1992, exports have been regarded as a successful part of
the Russian transition. It has generally been assumed that the
growth of exports meant that a large part of Russia's economy
was meeting the ultimate market test. In fact, this is far from
true. Many Russian exports actually lose money. But for par-
ticipants in the Virtual Economy the goal of exporting is not
profit, but cash. Enterprises continue to export because they
need to meet the cash constraint. The losses they incur are
considered a necessary cost of staying in business in the Vir-
tual Economy.
Households in the Virtual Economy operate with a similar
kind of cash constraint. They allocate effort between working
in M and earning cash on their own or otherwise sustaining
themselves through activity not directly connected to the sys-
tem (e.g., street vending, production of food in family garden
plots, etc.). This sort of activity is thus good for the Virtual
Economy, not a threat or alternative to it. It reduces the
minimum amount of cash that has to be supplied to house-
holds from within the system.
Finally, one should note that the minimal amount of cash in
this system does not mean cash is irrelevant in Russia. Just the
opposite. In the land of the cashless, the man with pocket
change is king... or at least, an "oligarch," as Russian big capi-
talists and financiers are called. Some Russian capitalists cer-
tainly have more than pocket change, but in international
terms they are not particularly big. Perhaps the most famous
of the financial barons, Vladimir Potanin, heads a bank, On-
eximbank, that would not rank among the top 100 by size in
the United States. (The combined size of Oneximbank and
one of its chief rivals, Menatep, is smaller than that of Cen-
tura Banks in Rocky Mount, N.C.) It is the Russian tycoons'
Paralyzed Enterprises
Policy Studies, January 199940
relatively cash-rich status in a cashless economy that gives
them so much power.
Implications
This system has a number of significant- and negative  con-
sequences. Suffice it to mention three areas of impact: (1)
enterprise restructuring; (2) measurement of economic per-
formance; and (3) the public sector.
The effect on enterprise restructuring is the most obvious.
Even those (admittedly few) enterprises that probably could
restructure and become viable in the marketplace do not.
They don't restructure, because restructuring is costly and
because they can survive as value-subtractors.
The effect on apparent aggregate economic performance,
things like GDP and output, has already been suggested.
Output in the Virtual Economy is overpriced by a factor of
two or three, even up to five times. Russia's GDP is inflated.
Russia's economy is likely even smaller than official figures
suggest (not bigger, as many people say). Its year-to-year
growth is also exaggerated. When value-subtractors increase
their output, it is bad news, not good, even though in the Vir-
tual Economy it shows up as increased GDP. Russia's statistics
agency has reported that GDP grew by 0.8% in 1997. The ex-
tra value-added it reports is almost surely "virtual," not real.
The effect on the public sector may be the most important of
all. The Virtual Economy changes the whole nature of a
budget. A budget should be a plan of priorities for public
spending. In a democracy, the reason for a budget to be de-
bated and adopted by the legislature is to democratically de-
cide what society's priorities are. Because cash allows full
freedom and flexibility in meeting the needs as defined by
the budget, it ensures maximum efficiency and equity. Pay-
ment of taxes in kind upsets this. Take, for example, the case
of the Chelyabinsk subway.
On March 23, the governor of Chelyabinsk oblast (province)
declared the construction of a subway system in the city of
Chelyabinsk to be one of the most important construction
projects in the region. The project is being financed by the
tax debt of construction companies to the federal, oblast, and
local budgets. The Chelyabinsk subway story is a good illustra-
tion of how public policy priorities become shaped by the
rather fortuitous existence of tax obligations by certain com-
panies. In this case, construction companies in Chelyabinsk
were deeply in arrears on their taxes to the local and to the
Virtual economy allows
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federal government. At the same time, the federal govern-
ment owed Chelyabinsk funds but was late with disburse-
ment. The local government was more or less forced to ac-
cept the construction companies' offer of a big construction
project in lieu of the debts, while the federal government
canceled the companies' tax arrears in lieu of the federal con-
tribution to Chelyabinsk. The end result is a subway. It does
not matter if the city and oblast have more pressing needs.
When goods are delivered in kind as tax offsets, it's a seller's
market.
The Government's Role
The Virtual Economy is not an exclusively negative phe-
nomenon. In the most general sense, it is Russia's social safety
net. The most important contribution it makes is jobs, albeit
at minimum wages. Because of this role, Russia has indeed
enjoyed social stability. Wage arrears rose to an all-time high
in the first quarter of this year. Yet, during the month of
March, there were a total of only 70 officially declared strikes
(strikes lasting longer than one day) in the entire country. Of
those, 22 were in industry, involving a total of 7,700 workers.
(Russian industry employs over 15 million people in all.) On
April 1, only seven industrial strikes continued.
But there are limits to the stability. In May Russia experi-
enced a nationwide protest by coal miners over wage arrears.
They blocked trains carrying passengers and freight, and
their protest was only ended when the government (again)
promised to pay wage arrears. This is an instructive example
of how things operate in the Virtual Economy. The funda-
mental problem in the mines is that most are not economi-
cally viable. The proper policy would be to shut down the
mines and compensate the miners so that they can seek jobs
elsewhere. The promise to pay the wage arrears thus repre-
sents a capitulation to the dictates of the Virtual Economy.
The events in the coal miners' strike underscore one of the
roles in government in the Virtual Economy, that of arbiter.
To pay the miners' wage arrears required shifting value from
some other use, as Boris Yeltsin recognized when he noted
that miners were no more deserving than teachers or others
whose wages are in arrears. Since the Virtual Economy neces-
sarily produces expectations that cannot be met for everyone
at all times, conflict and rivalry are inherent. The government
must be an arbiter among participants in the system.
Government represents a
capitulation to the dic-
tates of the Virtual Econ-
omy, though continues to
act as an arbiter. As the
system creates expecta-
tions that cannot be sat-
isfied simultaneously, the
government has to settle
down conflicts between
the participants of the
system.
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"Leakage"
The second task that falls to the government is to make the
system more efficient by reducing "leakage" of value from the
system. Leakage raises the cost of operating the Virtual Econ-
omy. Keeping more value within the system by plugging the
leaks conserves on the value needed to continue the system.
Leakage from the Virtual Economy takes several forms. It can
be legal or illegal, sanctioned or unsanctioned. The value that
leaks out may stay inside the country or may be transferred
abroad (capital flight). The most important distinction, how-
ever, is whether the leakage is good for the system or bad for
it. Good leakage can be thought of as a necessary cost of keep-
ing some participants in the game. That would be one way of
thinking about Gazprom. In our example, Gazprom contrib-
utes all of the value it produces to the system. As a privatized
company one would assume that its owners would prefer to
export all the gas for hard currency. But this is politically im-
possible. In practice, Gazprom is allowed to siphon off (and
pocket) a certain share as payment to keep it performing its
role in the system.
While some leakage is thus good for the Virtual Economy
because it makes the system work (like the Gazprom cut),
other leakage is damaging (like the theft of wage funds,
which makes it more difficult to meet the cash constraint, or
diversion of cash from taxes). Viewed in the context of leak-
age, the relationship between fighting corruption and eco-
nomic reform takes on greater complexity. Reducing corrup-
tion is typically considered a key element in accelerating eco-
nomic reform. In Russia's Virtual Economy, the opposite may
in fact be the case. If reducing corruption results in less leak-
age from the system, more value remains to support the con-
tinued operation of loss making enterprises.
The West's Response
How should we react to all this, as the West is now being
called upon once again to provide emergency funds for Rus-
sia? The first step is to acknowledge how severely the exis-
tence of the Virtual Economy constrains us. We have been
complicit in the emergence of the Virtual Economy. It could
not have developed to the extent it has, and arguably might
not have become as corrupt and inefficient as it has, unless
we had infused funds from the outside  well over $70 billion
since 1992. It is futile to think that today, six years later, we
can force the Russians, as a condition for our aid, to put
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themselves through the wrenching process of dismantling
this system. It would not work, and the attempt to do so on
our part would damage us severely in the eyes of ordinary
Russians.
We are left with two choices. The first is to concentrate on
keeping Russia stable in the short term by bailing out the Vir-
tual Economy. If we choose this course, we should be aware of
the price for ourselves and for Russia. It will mean further
consolidation of a backward, noncompetitive economy.
Our second option is simply to discontinue financing such a
costly dead-end. We can refuse a bailout. Here, too, we must
weigh the consequences. What concretely would happen? In
the absence of a bailout, it is highly unlikely that the ruble's
value could be maintained against the dollar. Foreign capital
will flee the equity markets and, most importantly, the do-
mestic government debt market. Russia would have more
difficulty borrowing from abroad. All of these events would
have some immediate negative effects on the Russian econ-
omy. But we do not believe that any of them would be calami-
tous. More important is that in the longer run the effects
would be salutary.
The most direct impact of a ruble depreciation would be on
those with large dollar-denominated liabilities. The largest
commercial banks would be in the most difficult straits, and
some would not survive. But it is important to be clear on the
impact of this. Nearly 80% of Russian households' bank de-
posits  and disproportionately more for lower-income
households  are in the state savings bank, Sberbank, which
would be relatively immune. The demise of some commercial
banks would certainly have an adverse impact on the econ-
omy, but it would not cause a collapse in the monetary sys-
tem, primarily because such a large share of transactions al-
ready take place outside it. One major result of a banking col-
lapse would be a decline in the power of the banking oli-
garchs. But it is not clear that is all bad.
How about inflation? It is true that the past three years' battle
against inflation in Russia seems to have been a success. A
return to the era of continuous price rises of the 1992-1995
period would be unfortunate. But a revival of inflation would
depend on more than a depreciation of the ruble. The cru-
cial factor in avoiding a resurgence of inflation is to maintain
the Central Bank's policy of not printing money to cover
budget deficits. This will be the big test for the government.
Here, too, the key is to abandon pretense. Until now, the
government has been able to sustain its policy of not monetiz-
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ing the deficit by simply borrowing, at home and abroad.
This is a big part of the problem that led to the current crisis.
On that count alone, a depreciation can help rather than
hurt because it will make it more difficult for Russia to bor-
row to finance current deficits. Currency risks that have been
underappreciated, not to say ignored, will now raise the cost
of external borrowing. Even domestic debt will become more
expensive, as much of the increase in treasury debt during
1997 was purchased by foreign investors. Thus depreciation
will raise the cost of finance. It will make more apparent the
true state of Russia's public finances. But if Russian economic
policy is currently addicted to borrowing, then cutting off the
supply of credit may be the best way to eliminate this danger-
ous habit.
In short, we do not think that even the short-term economic
consequences of refusing Russia a bailout would be overly
serious. There may well be, and probably should be, some
political repercussions. But for any conceivable scenario of
backlash that would result today, the outcome of a default
and financial crash after another year, or two, or three of
continuing along the same path as now would be much
worse.
Our proposal is not a "magic bullet." It is merely the better of
two bad alternatives. Refusing a bailout will not in itself guar-
antee any good results, and it will have some bad ones. It will
of course save the money that otherwise would go to refi-
nance Russian debt. But perhaps more important is that we
would finally place responsibility for Russia's economic fu-
ture with the Russians themselves. By abandoning the pre-
tense that our aid is contingent upon adoption of market re-
form (since it has not been and cannot be), we would be
sending the message to Russians that the choices you make
on economic policy are yours alone. You appear to have cho-
sen the Virtual Economy. Fine, stick with it if you like. But
now you must know the price, because there is one.
Denying Russia a bailout is not without risks. But bailing out
the Virtual Economy is sure to increase those risks for the
future.
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Is the private sector more
efficient?
Yanusz SZYRMER, Volodymyr DUBROBSKIY, Tamara SHYGAYEVA
Harvard Institute for International Development
Experts of the Harvard Institute for International Development developed a new
approach to the analysis of privatization process in Ukraine. They concentrated
their research rather on indicators that reflect the efficiency of enterprises
performance than on comparing gross indicators, reported by the state and
collective sectors. Analysis of the official data, which covers the period 1995-
1997, proves higher profitability, labor and capital effectiveness in the private
sector of Ukraine
Present evaluations on privatization
are negative
Privatization in Ukraine is still not viewed as a positive factor
for increasing the efficiency of enterprises and the economy
in general. However, results of privatization in other coun-
tries appear generally positive. Data presented in works by
Magison, Bukharie, and Kosse36 prove that enterprises be-
came more effective after they had been privatized. Research
conducted by these experts in 40 countries of the world has
shown that enterprises increase their profitability, and em-
ploy more effectively their labor capacities and investment.
Such a perceptible difference between the outcomes of priva-
tization in Ukraine and other economies may be explained
by:
§ The way Ukrainians think of privatization, which did not
lead to the rapid creation of effective ownership
§ Unfavorable post-privatization environment  hyperin-
flation and as a consequence, strict monetary policy; the
price shock that occurred in 1993-1994 due to the tran-
sition to world prices; and high budget deficit, which led
to a crowding-out effect in 1996-1998
                                                                
36 Magison V.  Consequences of privatization. Economic reforms
today. 1998
Privatization in Ukraine
is still not viewed as a
positive factor. As a re-
sult, the expected positive
effect from privatization
is not seen from perform-
ance indicators. We find
it more useful to discuss
differences between the
behavior of state and
private enterprises and
therefore decided to ana-
lyze indicators of these
sectors performance.
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As a result, performance indicators do not show an expected
positive effect from privatization  based upon them, one
cannot expect privatized enterprises to work more efficiently.
Thus, we find it more useful to discuss differences between
the behavior of state and private enterprises, if they exist.
One may find several opinions regarding this issue. The Cen-
ter for Post-Privatization support of enterprises, based on its
consulting work with various firms, considers privatized en-
terprises to start to behave more market-like.
On the other hand, Blackman and Praior37 is an advocate for
the thesis that Ukrainian enterprises of different forms of
property that have been examined do not distinct from each
other significantly. While analyzing the results of the survey
which was conducted among managers of enterprises, ex-
perts of the International Centre for Policy Studies did not
find any essential differences between the surveyed state and
private enterprises38. In our opinion, the roots of such results
lie in the methodology of surveys. Respondents were asked to
give qualitative estimates of their enterprises work dynamics.
Most of them answered that they see no relation between the
form of ownership and profitability. While this proves that
the performance of both state and private enterprises was
continuously worsening, this answer cannot still serve as a
background for the comparative analysis of state and private
enterprises at the moment of time. Besides, the research en-
visioned evaluating gross indicators, such as output and sales,
which were most important for the evaluation of enterprises
in the FSU.
In distinction of these authors, we decided to examine differ-
ences between the performance of private and state enter-
prises in the same time periods, if any.
Data allow for conducting a thorough
analysis
Our analysis is based on data reported by the State Statistics
Committee of Ukraine on the performance of enterprises of
different ownership during 1995-97. We did not consider the
data for previous periods, due to 1992-94 hyperinflation in
                                                                
37 Praior F., Blackman M. The Ukrainian Industrial Sector in 1996
and 1997: Insights from the Rapid Enterprise Survey. 1998.
38 Business Opinion Review, #1, 1998.
Our analysis is based on
data reported by the State
Statistics Committee of
Ukraine during 1995-
97. We chose two groups
of enterprises for our
analysis: those of state
and collective ownership.
Indicators were compared
discretely by years, as it
does not seem correct to
compare indicators be-
fore and after privati-
zation. We estimated two
groups of indicators: (1)
utilization of labor and
capital, and (2) profit-
ability.
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Ukraine, which makes the analysis less adequate. Besides, the
privatization process only started to develop then and could
be considered insignificant.
We employed only those indicators that were reported offi-
cially. A lot of them are calculated by Soviet methodology,
which cannot adequately evaluate the performance of enter-
prises operating under market conditions39. Albeit we think
that such a bias cannot be viewed as systematic with respect to
the form of ownership. Therefore, although such data cannot
serve as a basis for credible quantitative analysis, one may rely
upon qualitative evaluations.
We chose two groups of enterprises for our analysis: those of
state and collective ownership. In accordance with the
Ukrainian current classification, collective ownership consists
of open and closed stock companies. These create 48% of
industrial output in Ukraine. This group also includes leased
enterprises, the number of which has been  reduced down to
1%. These enterprises gave way to the majority of collective
firms, and this is important for comparing enterprises per-
formance in different years. Joint stock companies are also
included in the category of collective ownership, and today
their share is 3%. At the same time, the share of enterprises
that are specified private (according to the Ukrainian classi-
fication, these are to be in the property of individual owners
or members of their families) does not exceed 1%. There-
fore, the group of enterprises with collective ownership is
significant and can be compared to the group of state enter-
prises.
The groups mentioned above may be cross-checked both by
their share in gross output and by the capital accumulated in
each of them. Thus, in 1995 state industrial enterprises
owned 53% of fixed capital, while nowadays this number has
fallen to 43%. Collective industrial enterprises accumulated
46% of fixed capital in 1995, compared to 56% as of the end
of 1997.
                                                                
39 In particular, fixed capital is usually not capitalized; its book value
is classified as depreciable value adjusted by one time indexing and
may differ significantly both from the market value and nominal
statutory fund(which was not indexed).
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State and collective enterprises by major economic
branches
1997, %
Property Num-
ber
Fixed
assets
Num-
ber of
em-
ployed
Output Sales Pro-
fit
Industry State
13 43 31 41 43 44
Collective
83 56 68 58 56 55
Trans-
port
State
22 67 59 30 30 -32
Collective
72 27 33 68 68 132
Com-
munica-
tion
State
67 90 93 73 73 70
Collective
27 9 7 27 27 30
Con-
struction
State
13 50 17 19 18 15
Collective
78 47 80 78 79 82
Trade State
4 4 5 4 3 -49
Collective
81 83 84 80 82 132
Source: State Statistics Committee
The important difference is the number of enterprises in
each group: the shares of collective and state enterprises in
Ukraine of all existing economic entities are 83% and 13%
respectively. In other words, the average state enterprise is
much larger than the average collective firm is. In order to
estimate the relation between the size of a firm and its per-
formance, we carried out both single-valued and multiple-
valued analyses. They have shown an insignificant correlation
between the size and performance of an enterprise.
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In all cases indicators were compared discretely by years, as it
does not seem correct to compare indicators before and
after privatization, and criteria and methods for selecting
enterprises varied from year to year. Thus, the group of col-
lective enterprises privatized in 1997 includes both the group
of collective enterprises privatized in 1995 and some state
enterprises privatized during that period, which were not
chosen optionally.
An analysis was carried out by both economic branches and
more specifically by industries. We excluded from our analy-
sis the energy sector, which was entirely owned by state as of
the end of 1997. We also did not include the agricultural sec-
tor, which was in collective property before reforms were ini-
tiated, and remains roughly unchanged due to the absence of
land reform.
We estimated two groups of indicators: (1) utilization of labor
and capital, and (2) profitability.
To assess the utilization of labor and capital, we calculated:
(1) output per worker, (2) output per UAH 1 of fixed assets,
(3) proportions of an enterprises output and sales. Profit-
ability was estimated by the following criteria: (1) return on
sales, (2) return on output, (3) profitability of production,
(4) return on working capital, and (4) return on assets.
How to prove distinctions between
sectors
To identify statistically a significant difference between core
indicators of state and collective enterprises performance in
different branches we involved two instruments, such as:
standard t-test for the averages and linear regression.
The t-test was to verify the linear hypothesis that assumes no
correlation between the form of ownership and performance
of an enterprise. Thus, the null hypothesis is true if P-value >
10%, and is false when P-value < 10%. For example, in 1997
the average40 return on assets was 4% for collective enter-
prises, while for state firms it was only 1%. In this case, the
difference between these indicators may be considered sig-
nificant, as P = 5%.
                                                                
40 The average stands for the average (not-weighted) by the analyzed
sample. Therefore, it may differ from the average calculated at
micro-level, as the sum of fractions differs from the fraction of sums.
To identify the difference
between core indicators of
state and collective enter-
prises performance we
involved two instru-
ments, such as: a stan-
dard t-test for the aver-
ages and linear regres-
sion. The t-test was to
verify the linear hy-
pothesis that assumes no
correlation between the
form of ownership and
performance of an enter-
prise.
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At the same time, the t-test only helps indicate whether popu-
lations presented in analyzed sets are different or not. The
test cannot assess the character of and proportions between
the defined differences. To value the correlation between
indicators of state and collective enterprises performance we
have run regression. We put the indicators of state enter-
prises for independent variable (x) and indicators of collec-
tive entities  for dependent variable (y).
In regression analysis, the null hypothesis means that the
trend is not statistically different from the line y=0. In other
words, irrespective of the state sectors performance, the ex-
pected difference between indicators of state and collective
sectors equals zero. The intercept of regression is the pre-
mium for operating in the collective sector, while the slope of
regression reflects how the effect depends on the value of
respective state sectors indicator. We did not aim at develop-
ing an instrument which would forecast the quantitative ef-
fect of privatization in particular branches based on the data
regarding the operation of the state sector. Our research tar-
gets at verifying the statistical significance of the intercept
from zero. At that, if the slope of regression is statistically in-
significant (P-value > 10%), the correlation between starting
characteristics of state enterprises and the form of ownership
does not exist. At the same time, if the intercept is more than
zero, the result is simply that the effect is positive and statisti-
cally significant, but is not dependent on the branch.
For example, the regression for return on assets is
y = -0.04x+4%. At that, the P-value for the intercept equals 5%
and, therefore, may be considered significant. In the mean-
time, the slope has P-value = 92%, which proves its insignifi-
cance and arbitrary character of the line. However, the statis-
tical significance of the intercept (even though the slope is
not significant) allows one to conclude that the collective sec-
tor is more advantageous by the criterion for return on assets.
Breakthrough in the collective sector
in 1997
According to results we received, all indicators advocate for
the collective sector. Thus, in 1997 collective enterprises util-
ized all factors of production more effectively. This goes be-
yond the discussed tests regarding returns on assets and con-
cerns the fixed and working capital even more. The intercept
in the regression for output per UAH 1 of fixed assets is sig-
nificant (0.5937), which means more effective utilization of
All indicators advocate
for the collective sector. It
has much higher returns
on fixed assets and prof-
itability. Results that we
received differ from year
to year. Initial position of
state enterprises was more
advantageous than that
of collective companies
due to state price regula-
tion. However, in 1997
collective enterprises
managed to leave state
firms behind by profits
they received. This re-
sulted from higher sales
of the former and more
efficient labor and capi-
tal utilization.
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fixed assets in the collective sector of the economy. Besides,
their distribution is more regular, which also reflects its mar-
ket nature.
Output per UAH1 of fixed assets
y = 0,266x + 0,5937
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Collective enterprises are generally more profitable, but the
rate of profitability is significantly higher in branches with
low yields. The statement that returns on sales by collective
enterprises is rather high is confirmed by the regression
equation, in which both the intercept (0.056, P-value=6%)
and the slope (-0.6181, P-value=5%) are significant.
Returns on sales
1997
y = -0.6181x + 0.056
P-value 5%        6%
Probability of concurrence with zero-effect line
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Results that we received differ from year to year. Thus, in
1995 advantages of the collective sector were not notable and
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always clearly seen. They almost disappeared in 1996 but re-
covered in 1997.
Indicators of state and collective enterprises per-
formance in 1995-97
Average Intercept
state collec-
tive
1997
Output per UAH1 of fixed assets 0,43 0,71 0,38
Return on sales 2% 6% 6%
Return on working capital (book
profit) 7% 14% 9%
Return on working capital (re-
turn on sales) 1% 7% 7%
Return on assets 1% 4% %
1996
Output per UAH1 of fixed assets 0,61 0,46 2,98
Return on sales 8% 10% 5%
Return on working capital (book
profit) 32% 39% 6%
Return on working capital (re-
turn on sales) 12% 12% 9%
Return on assets 3% 5% 3%
1995
Output per UAH1 of fixed assets 3,35 2,98 0,38
Return on sales
17% 20% -2%
Return on working capital (book
profit) 17% 19% 18%
Return on working capital (re-
turn on sales) 29% 31% 6%
Return on assets 15% 20% 8%
Significant values are shown in bold (P-value<10)
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Improvements in the performance of the collective sector in
1995 do not come from privatization, which was not efficient
and resulting then. This, though, may be explained by a
larger share of efficient enterprises in the collective sector in
1995.
In 1996 the rapid pace of privatization led to an increase in
the number of collective enterprises and those employed in
this sector by 10-12%. The growth of fixed assets was some-
what slower but reached 8%. At the same time, that year the
collective sector did not remain as attractive as in 1995.
Moreover, the average indicators of the collective sectors
performance went even lower than relevant indicators of the
state sector, though this difference is not statistically signifi-
cant. The decline results from the fact that among enterprises
privatized in 1996, weak ones predominate. However, during
that period entire branches owned by the state became un-
profitable, while collective enterprises reported negative re-
sults less often.
The process of privatization continued on in 1997, though it
became less active. In industry, the number of privatized en-
terprises increased by 5%, while the share of fixed assets in
this sector grew only by 2%. Respective indicators shown in
other sectors were even lower. A considerable increase con-
cerned only the number of those employed in collective en-
terprises, which reached its highest (9%) in the industry.
Though firms privatized in 1997 were not attractive, the per-
formance of the collective sector began changing for the bet-
ter. At the same time, state enterprises evidently divided into
highly profitable (fuel and gas and energy companies, alco-
holic beverage enterprises) and loss-making ones (with the
largest share in coal-mining industry).
Why in 1997 did the collective sector become more efficient
than the state sector, while the difference between them was
almost insignificant during previous years?
First, this may be explained by absolutely different economic
rules, which are appropriate for these sectors. The state sec-
tor relies absolutely on the assistance of the government. This
results in higher profits of state enterprises that operate in
the branches where the state possesses the status of monopo-
list and can control the formation of prices. At the same time,
state enterprises are less profitable than collective firms, op-
erating in the same branch free from administrative price
regulation. The analysis we have made only proved that the
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main factor to influence productivity is administrative price
regulation. A multiple regression equation for the returns on
sales is:
y= 0.04+1.93x1+0.91x2  0.4x3,
where x1 = administrative price regulation, x2 = capital
structure (ratio of working capital to fixed assets), x3 = ratio
of net debt to working capital.
In other words, the initial position of state enterprises was
more advantageous than that of collective companies due to
state price regulation. Later on, though, while management
in the state sector remained unchanged, private enterprises
started to grow after the consolidation of their share pack-
ages. The second factor to influence returns on sales in this
regression is capital structure, which is the ratio of working
capital to fixed assets. The ratio is much better in the collec-
tive sector, which, on average, has 7 times higher returns on
working capital. This mainly results from higher volumes of
sales by collective firms than by state enterprises. The ratio
between the cost of sold and produced goods was not lower
than 1 in the collective sector, while the state sector went be-
low this indicator in many branches.
Higher efficiency of sales in the collective sector mainly re-
sults from:
§ Collective enterprises target directly at maximizing their
sales and are more flexible with changing agreed prices.
This can be clearly seen from the graph, which shows
more regular distribution of production profitability in
the collective sector. Therefore, the collective sector
starts living after the market law of normal profit, while
state enterprises are far from that
§ Collective firms refuse the production of non-profitable
goods and switch over to producing higher paying ones.
One can see numerous examples in various economic
branches, first of all, in collective communication en-
terprises, construction and food industries
§ Contrary to state firms, loss-making collective enter-
prises are usually shut down. This proves the dynamics
in the number of enterprises which have different forms
of ownership and operate in different economic sectors.
The most successful example would be catering enter-
prises.
However, the secret of higher profitability in the collective
sector lies in more efficient utilization of labor and capital,
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which was apparent during 1995-96. However, results re-
ceived from the t-test and regression analysis for 1997 showed
a substantial difference between these indicators calculated
for different economic branches depending on the form of
ownership. In addition, calculations for labor and capital ef-
ficiency, contrary to profitability, are more reliable and based
on the number of employees, structure of fixed assets, and
volumes of sales, which are less distorted.
Conclusions (in favor of the private
sector)
Based on our analysis of different enterprises performance,
we argue that the private sector of the Ukrainian economy
better adjusts to the changing environment and demon-
strates higher efficiency. This is very important for its rapid
development in the future. This thesis is reinforced by the
high co-ordination of indicators calculated on the basis of
differently grouped data. Thus, higher profitability of the
collective sector is positively correlated to higher labor and
capital efficiency, although these calculations are based on
different initial parameters.
The private sector of
Ukrainian economy bet-
ter adjusts to the chang-
ing environment and
demonstrates higher effi-
ciency. This is very im-
portant for its rapid de-
velopment in the future.
